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I. INTRODUCTION 
Issues dealing with children who have been neglected, abused, 
or otherwise harmed and have been through the social welfare 
system and placed in foster care, continue to be baffling for both 
social services and the courts. Yet, the question continues to be, 
what do we do with them now? It has been agreed for years that, 
historically, “[n]umerous transfers from one caregiver to another 
can have a negative impact on the child’s development and sense 
of belonging,”1 and within that context, the failure of the court 
system to provide for children during child protection proceedings 
and after termination of parental rights (TPR) of the biological 
parents has caused significant and ongoing conflict. In many cases 
these proceedings have been detrimental to the child, poorly 
thought out by social services, unsupported by the courts, and 
unsuccessful in alleviating the problems of providing stability for 
these children. 
In addressing this problem, concepts of “concurrent planning” 
were developed with the original thought that a permanent 
placement of a child after the TPR of the biological parents was, in 
 
 1.  Jane Ranum, Minnesota’s Permanency and Concurrent Planning Child Welfare 
System, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687, 688 (2000). “The hallmark of good child 
welfare social work is the ability to rapidly secure a child’s physical and emotional 
well-being in the context of her family of origin or in another permanent family.” 
Id. (quoting MARY FORD, THREE CONCURRENT PLANNING PROGRAMS: HOW THEY 
BENEFIT CHILDREN AND SUPPORT PERMANENCY PLANNING FAMILIES 2 (1998)). 
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fact, in the child’s best interests.2 In addition, it was assumed that 
permanent placement was, in fact, permanent placement.3 It is in 
this context that changes in the attitudes of the courts and social 
services were first confronted, and it is within this context that 
children have been circulated and returned back into the system 
after an original “permanent placement” has failed.4 Thus, social 
welfare systems were directed to not only begin preparing case 
plans to try to reunify children with their parents upon their initial 
entry into the system, but at the same time to make plans 
“concurrently,” assuming that if reunification of the child was 
unsuccessful, then some permanent placement would end the 
journey.5 
“Concurrent planning is a form of permanent planning that 
seeks to limit the amount of time a child, in the child welfare 
system, waits for a permanent home. The focus of concurrent 
planning is on those children for whom reunification with a parent 
is not likely.”6 As a result of this shift in attitude, various statutory 
changes were implemented to give assistance to persons providing 
permanent placement for children, and, simultaneously, time 
limits were placed upon the welfare system and the courts, during 
which they were required to move forward towards permanency 
even if the original case plan for reunification had not been 
completed.7 It was noted: 
[T]he goal of concurrent planning is to abridge this 
process so that reunification efforts occur simultaneously 
with other efforts to establish a permanent home for the 
child. Contrary to conceptual simplicity, . . . concurrent 
planning is the product of a decade long effort to 
promote permanency. These efforts were propelled, to a 
great extent, by federal government actions.8 
 
 2.  For further background, see Wright S. Walling & Stacia W. Driver, 
Celebrating 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—a Historical Overview and 
Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883 (2006). 
 3.  See id. at 915–16.  
 4.  For further background, see Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private 
CHIPS Petitions in Minnesota: The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in 
Need of Protection or Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781 (1994).  
 5.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 688.  
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See id. at 696.  
 8.  Id. at 689. 
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As pressure mounted to place children in “permanent homes” 
more quickly, social welfare systems and courts began to reach out 
to prospective adoptive parents, including relatives, to provide 
permanent and, in most cases, adoptive homes for these children.9 
At the time they were being recruited, adoptive parents received 
almost no education and little information regarding the children 
was given to them.10 In fact, often the information coming out of a 
child protection or court file was not given to the social workers 
handling the adoption, and it was most definitely not given to the 
adoptive parents. The foundation for success was often severely 
lacking. 
As a process of concurrent planning was developed and 
implemented in an effort at reunification, the expected and 
obvious conflict between effective development of case plans on 
behalf of families and the timelines pushing toward the 
permanency of a placement for a child became more and more 
obvious. Furthermore, when a parent’s chemical dependency or 
mental health was at issue, treatment often could not be completed 
before the statutory deadline to complete the case plan, inevitably 
leading to TPR.11 The result has often been a mishmash of 
 
 9.  See Patrick Yagle, When Adoption Goes Wrong: Giving Up Custody to Get Kids 
the Mental Help They Need, ILL. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011, 2:40 PM), http://illinoistimes 
.com/article-8964-when-adoption-goes-wrong.html; see also Kelli Kennedy, Experts 
Push Disclosure of Failed Foster Adoptions, READING EAGLE (Aug. 22, 2011, 4:53 AM), 
http://www2.readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=327803 (discussing the difficulties 
of adopting foster children and the lack of services available to adoptive families).  
 10.  “Overall statistical reports reveal very few dissolutions and disruptions.” 
CYNTHIA R. MABRY & LISA KELLY, ADOPTION LAW: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 705 
(2006). One report indicates that after an adoption is finalized, only 0.4% to 5.4% 
of adoptions are dissolved. Id. Some have been critical of such studies: 
Some reports are criticized, however, because they are limited to small 
populations of children or one geographical area. Also, all studies use 
the same subjects—children who are adopted from public agencies—
so no information is available for rates of dissolutions and disruptions 
in private adoptions. States either do not collect the information, 
inaccurately record the information, utilize different definitions for 
dissolution and disruption, or are reluctant to disclose the data.  
Id. In addition, however, “the disruption rate for adoptions ranges from ten to 
twenty-five percent of adoptions depending upon how an empirical study is 
conducted (i.e., older adoptees are isolated from the study or the study 
encompasses children from only one state).” Id. For older children, the disruption 
rate is much higher at twenty-five percent. Id. “The highest rate of disruption 
occurs within the first twelve to eighteen months of the placement.” Id. at 705–06.  
 11.  See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1 (2012).  
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confusing standards applied by courts, social services, and 
individuals based on personalities and work ethics rather than 
treatment needs, goals, or recognition of family. 
This crisis has resulted from the lack of training and 
understanding of the issues by social workers and therapists, as well 
as the lack of creative statutory criteria designed to deal with these 
issues and provide the support and stability needed by the children 
and the parents.12 It is, in fact, a failure of an essentially self-created 
system, which uses a short-term model that does not account for 
the long-term needs of children and families. 
II. EARLY MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE 
From a historical perspective, Minnesota developed its 
statutory history and background in a similar manner to other 
states around the country. These changes reflected the social 
movements occurring on a national level, and Minnesota, as did 
other states, began early in the twentieth century to specifically 
address the needs of “dependent and neglected” children.13 From 
that point to today, the manner in which the courts and mental 
health social services deal with such children has been hotly 
debated as the social movement and philosophical decisions have 
shifted back and forth.14 More specifically, the early Minnesota 
“neglect” statute, enacted in 1905, reflects the broad and sweeping 
powers similar to those found in other states and enacted at the 
turn of the century.15 Often the child could be removed for 
undetermined reasons of parental unfitness, including poverty in a 
variety of forms. 
As noted in other articles detailing the issue’s historical 
background, even these early statutes reflect the debate that exists 
today over whether it is the responsibility of the state or the family 
to protect and punish “dependent or neglected” children.16 While 
recognizing the authority and control of the state through its 
 
 12.  See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 808–26. 
 13.  Id. at 794–815.  
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See Act approved Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 7, 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 418; 
ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST 
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987); Walling & 
Debele, supra note 4, at 802–08. 
 16.  See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 798–815 (exploring the historical 
background of the Minnesota statutes).  
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course, the statutes began to look at other options and other 
persons to file petitions alleging that children were neglected or 
dependent, as long as such persons resided in the county and knew 
of the child who appeared to be neglected or dependent.17 
Yet, as often noted, these hundred-year-old statutes provided 
few procedural protections for children. They nevertheless 
recognized the interrelationship between the authority and 
discussions with the court system, the general responsibility of 
families to police their own members, and the bringing of 
appropriate matters to the attention of the court system to work 
with social services mental health professionals.18 
As with statutes passed in other states at the turn of the 
century, early dependency and neglect statutes in Minnesota 
struggled to define exactly what a “dependent” or “neglected” child 
was, or should be. These statutes define circumstances under which 
nondelinquent behavior by children should be brought before the 
court and, more specifically, how these children should be dealt 
with.19 
Comments by courts and professionals in the early twentieth 
century reflect the ongoing and continuing attempts at dealing 
with individualized issues for specific children through the 
development of ongoing programs.20 Writing in the first issue of 
the Minnesota Law Review, Judge Edward F. Waite of the Hennepin 
County Juvenile Court stated, “We live in what has been aptly 
 
 17.  Walling & Driver, supra note 2, at 898.  
 18.  See id. at 904–13. 
 19.  Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 803. The 1905 statute defined 
“dependent child” and “neglected child” as follows:  
[A]ny child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; 
or dependent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental 
care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or receives alms; or who is 
found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or disreputable 
persons, or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on 
the part of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may 
be, is an unfit place for such a child; and any child under the age of 
ten (10) years who is found begging, peddling or selling any articles or 
singing or playing any musical instrument upon the street, or giving 
any public entertainment, or who accompanies or is used in aid of any 
person so doing.  
Act approved Apr. 19, 1905, § 7, 1905 Minn. Laws at 418 (“An act to regulate the 
treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children.”).  
 20.  See, e.g., Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. 
REV. 48 (1917). 
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termed the ‘century of the child.’ Never before have the 
obligations of society to its more helpless members been so 
generally recognized; and of all forms of helpless that of childhood 
makes the strongest and most universal appeal.”21 In describing the 
approach taken by the court, Judge Waite listed what he believed to 
be the specific and significant accomplishments that the State of 
Minnesota had achieved in addressing the needs of dependent and 
neglected children, including the creation of reform schools for 
youthful offenders, schools for the deaf and blind, juvenile courts, 
state hospitals for crippled children, and “Mother’s Pensions,” 
which were, in his opinion, a significant movement toward helping 
these children who find themselves in the category of neglected 
and dependent children.22 The programs largely reflected the 
developments occurring in other states and, from a needs 
standpoint, are reflective of the considerations existing in the 
twenty-first century in attempting to deal with the specific 
individualized needs of children.23 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
During the 1970s the number of children entering the public 
care system increased significantly.24 This increase resulted in 
children staying in the system much longer than in previous years.25 
As lawmakers became increasingly concerned by the number of 
children in the protection system, coupled with the lack of 
standard procedures, Congress initially enacted the Adoption 
Assistance of Child Welfare Act of 1980.26 
While “[t]he Act’s laudatory goals were to discourage excessive 
reliance on foster care placement and to permit greater use of 
 
 21.  Id. at 48.  
 22.  Id. at 48–49.  
 23.  See id. 
 24.  See Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for 
Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 445 
(2003).  
 25.  Id. at 446 (“The numbers of children placed in foster care has grown in 
part due to limited availability of resources for other forms of familial support and 
in part due to state laws and regulations that created a process for removing a 
child from the home but were less clear on how to help the families . . . . Stays in 
foster care turned out to be long for many children . . . .”). For a general 
discussion of the issues, see Walling & Debele, supra note 4.  
 26.  Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 
94 Stat. 500. 
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services assisting in family reunification,”27 it also resulted in 
slowing the process of placing children in permanent homes.28 
More specifically: 
[T]he legislative goals were not realized by thousands of 
children, and disproportionately for children of color. 
[Data showed] that while children of color [made] up 
35% of the general population, [those] children [made] 
up 64% of the children in foster care. Furthermore, 
children of color [were] more likely than white children 
to be placed in foster care and once placed, generally 
[stayed] in foster care longer and wait[ed] to be adopted 
longer than white children.29 
Despite the intent of the adoption assistance program’s initial 
federal legislation, statutes and rules were created in an effort to 
move children more swiftly into permanency both on the state and 
federal level.30 In addition, the process became more complicated 
because states now had to determine if a child was eligible for 
adoption assistance and, if so, how much. They were required to 
inform potential placement resources of the availability of adoption 
assistance funds as well.31 Since states had limited funds from which 
to draw adoption assistance, these inquiries and new eligibilities 
became a lengthy ordeal, again, slowing down the entire 
permanency process. Action was necessary to avoid this slow down. 
IV. SWIFT MOVEMENT TO PERMANENCY 
Pressure began to build to provide quicker permanent 
placements for special needs children. 
In December 1996, President Clinton directed the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, Donna Shalala, to conduct consultations and 
provide specific strategies to move children more quickly 
from foster care to permanent homes. His goal was to 
double the number of adoptions or permanent 
placements in five years.32 
 
 27.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 689. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See infra Parts IV, V.  
 31.  MINN. STAT. § 259A.05, subdiv. 4(b) (2012).  
 32.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 689–90. 
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The result was the creation of the Adoption 2000 Blueprint in 
February 1997.33 Among other things, the Blueprint, reflecting the 
attitude of social services and of the courts at the time, was based 
on the following eight assumptions: 
(1) Every child deserves a safe and permanent family; 
(2) Children’s health and safety is a paramount concern 
that must guide all child welfare services; 
(3) Children deserve prompt and timely decision-making 
as to who their permanent caregivers will be; 
(4) Permanency planning begins when a child enters 
foster care; foster care is a temporary setting; 
(5) Adoption is one of the pathways to a permanent 
family; 
(6) Adoptive families require support after the child’s 
adoption is legalized; 
(7) The diversity and strengths of all communities must 
be tapped; and 
(8) Quality services must be provided as quickly as 
possible to enable families in crisis to address 
problems.34 
Based on these assumptions, the federal government passed 
the Adoption of Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)35 to address 
critical issues in the child welfare system. This legislation 
incorporated the assumptions of the Adoption 2000 Blueprint and 
laid the groundwork for major child welfare reform—and in 
particular resulted in a shorter foster care period for children and 
a faster path to “permanent” homes.36 The five key principles of 
ASFA are: 
(1) Safety is a paramount concern that must guide all 
child welfare services; 
(2) Foster care is temporary; 
(3) Child welfare system[s] must focus on results and 
accountability; 
(4) Innovative approaches are needed to achieve the goals 
of safety, permanency, and well-being; and 
 
 33.  Id. at 690. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 
Stat. 2115. 
 36.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 690. 
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(5) Permanency planning efforts should begin as soon as 
the child enters care.37 
It is this last principle that really puts the emphasis and 
importance on “concurrent planning” by the states. “While ASFA 
did not require . . . concurrent planning, the Act [allowed for and] 
opened the door for states . . . to establish concurrent planning 
programs.”38 In addition, the federal statute assisted states by 
providing that “‘reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or 
with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable 
efforts’ to preserve and reunify families.”39 Technical assistance was 
also provided.40 
The incentive was now set for legislative and rulemaking action 
to move children through foster care systems more quickly. Moving 
children more quickly through the system resulted in less emphasis 
on reunification and more emphasis on recruitment of adoptive 
families to provide for the permanency needs of these special-needs 
children. 
V. STATES’ REACTIONS 
Due to extended delays in the foster care placement process, 
Adoption 2000’s stress on moving the process quicker, and the 
ASFA legislation, states began to enact statutes and rules regarding 
necessary timelines in order to move children out of foster care 
quickly.41 “Concurrent planning” through the court system began 
 
 37.  Id. at 690–91. 
 38.  Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012). 
 39.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 691 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F)). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  By way of example, and as a result of extended delays in the placement 
process described herein, states like Minnesota enacted legislation. See Act of 
May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 3, § 23, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 661. These rules set rigid 
timelines for permanency in order to facilitate quick placement. Minnesota Rule 
of Juvenile Protection Procedure 42.01 states: 
[A] child who is under eight (8) years of age at the time a petition is 
filed alleging the child to be in need of protection or services, the 
court shall conduct a permanency progress review hearing . . . not later 
than six (6) months after the child is placed in foster care or in the 
home of a noncustodial parent.  
MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01, subdiv. 5(a). The purpose of these time requirements 
is clear. They are meant to speed along the placement process which, presumably, 
is in the child’s best interests. The issue, however, is that requiring placement 
within a said period of time often has the effect of rushing placement 
10
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to dominate over case plans and reunification of children with 
parents.42 Once federal law allowed changes in statutory movements 
towards permanency, states began to enact the appropriate 
legislation.43 
In implementing the conceptual “concurrent planning” with 
permanency issues in general, a confluence of two dominant 
themes in child welfare emerged: the “attachment theory” and 
“foster care drift.”44 The attacking of and the interrelationship 
between these two themes led to dramatic movement by 
legislatures to set permanency guidelines. People in the system 
were concerned about the impact of the law and the impact that 
multiple placements had on children—specifically how they 
affected a child’s development of healthy and permanent 
attachments to permanent caregivers.45 
Most states began to set short time limits, anywhere from six 
months to one year of out-of-home placement.46 By that time, social 
welfare systems and courts were required to move toward TPR or 
some other sort of permanency. In most cases, this involved 
recruitment of adoptive parents and the placement of children who 
were maltreated, suffering unhealthy attachments, or otherwise 
abused into “permanent” adoptive homes.47 Standard rules in many 
states require movement towards permanency for a child under the 
age of eight within six months of the filing of a dependency, 
neglect, abuse, or protective services petition; or within one year 
for any child eight years of age or older at the time of removal from 
the home.48 By the end of that time period the court is required in 
most states to conduct a permanency progress review hearing 
requiring movement towards permanency.49 Reunification is only 
allowed if all of the family, chemical dependency, and mental 
illness issues have been significantly resolved. 
Factors to consider when conducting concurrent permanency 
planning are: the age of the child, the child’s special needs, the 
 
considerations, ultimately leading to a higher disruption rate. 
 42.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 69192. 
 43.  See, e.g., Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, §§ 1–3, 1988 Minn. 
Laws 1031, 1031–33.  
 44.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 693 (footnotes omitted). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.204(a) (2012); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01. 
 47.  See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201; MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.  
 48.  See, e.g., MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01, subdiv. 5.  
 49.  See id. 
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duration of the out-of-home placement, the prognosis for 
successful reunification with the parents, the availability of relatives 
or other concerned individuals that provide support or permanent 
placement for the child, and other factors affecting the child’s 
interests.50 
The system has sped up; children are being placed for 
permanency and adoptive homes more quickly. Simultaneously, 
however, there is a lack of time and funding to train the people 
who determine and assess case plans for parents to work to have 
their children return home. Thus, the path is set for a breakdown 
in coordinating timelines in the system between permanency for 
children and necessary mental health and chemical dependency 
treatment plans for parents. 
VI. MINNESOTA’S CURRENT STATUTORY STRUCTURE 
As practitioners, scholars, and politicians throughout the 
country debated philosophical attitudes and attempted to 
implement various approaches to dealing with neglected and 
dependent children, significant concern began to arise as to 
whether the labeling of a child as “neglected,” a family as having 
“neglected,” or a child as “dependent” provided some stigma-
tization of the child and the family.51 Throughout the country, and 
particularly in Minnesota, this resulted in language changes 
eliminating the words “neglect” and “dependent” in the provisions 
of the statute.52 
In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature created the category of the 
“Child in Need of Protection or Services” (CHIPS).53 This largely 
consisted of a consolidation of the previously delegated categories 
of “dependent” and “neglected,” but shifted from the previous 
categorization to a new category of a CHIPS child.54 It is debatable 
whether or not the resulting shift to a new categorization and 
terminology has reduced the stigmatization of being involved in a 
court system and having families’ lives directed by social services. 
 
 50.  Ranum, supra note 1, at 696. 
 51.  See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 782. 
 52.  Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, §§ 1–2, 1988 Minn. Laws 1031, 1032; 
Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 809–10. 
 53.  See Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, §§ 1–3, 1988 Minn. Laws at 1031–33. 
 54.  Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 810. 
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Nevertheless, Minnesota no longer has “dependent” or “neglected” 
children but rather has “CHIPS” children.55 
Additionally, the court proceedings are now referred to as 
“juvenile protection proceedings” wherein the adjudication 
determining that a child is a CHIPS child are handled, and 
Minnesota statutory criteria have very specific direction and 
philosophical goals with respect to those children.56 As reflected in 
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.001, subdivision 2, the direction to 
the courts and social services by the statute state in part: 
(a) The paramount consideration in all juvenile 
protection proceedings is the health, safety, and best 
interest of the child. . . . 
(b) The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile 
protection proceedings is: 
(1) to secure for each child under the jurisdiction 
of the Court, the care and guidance, preferably in the 
child’s own home, as will best serve the spiritual, 
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child; 
(2) to provide judicial procedures that protect the 
welfare of the child; 
(3) to preserve and strengthen the child’s family 
ties whenever possible and in the child’s best interests, 
removing the child from the custody of parents only 
when the child’s welfare or safety cannot be 
adequately safeguarded without removal; 
. . . . 
(5) to ensure that when placement is pursuant to 
court order, the court order removing the child or 
continuing the child in foster care contains an 
individualized determination that placement is in the 
best interests of the child that coincides with the 
actual removal of the child; 
(6) to ensure that when the child is removed, the 
child’s care and discipline is, as nearly as possible, 
equivalent to that which should have been given by 
the parents . . . .57 
Minnesota statutes here, and in other places within this part of 
the juvenile code, also describe in detail the requirements of the 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 57.  Id.  
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creation of a case plan after a child is removed from the home or 
deemed to be a CHIPS child, the requirements and timing with 
respect to looking at permanent placement, the available services 
through a “disposition plan” in the juvenile court for a CHIPS 
child, and the requirement of pursuing “concurrent planning” any 
time a child is removed from the home.58 The concurrent planning 
aspect discussed below provides the inherent conflict between 
statutory comments and mental health, chemical dependency, and 
other family-centered and individualized case plans. 
VII.  MINNESOTA’S DEFINITION OF CHIPS CHILDREN: HOW FAMILIES 
ENTER THE COURT AND SOCIAL SERVICES MAZE 
As the legislature struggled through the years with how to 
define those children and families who should come within the 
purview of required intervention by the state and social services 
personnel into their families, the legislature has similarly struggled 
to define a CHIPS child, providing an ever-increasing number of 
circumstances.59 Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 6 
provides detailed statutory criteria for defining a Child in Need of 
Protection or Services.60 More specifically, it states that a child may 
be found to be a Child in Need of Protection or Services if: 
(1) the child is abandoned; 
(2) the child is a victim of physical or sexual abuse or emotional 
maltreatment, resides with a victim of child abuse, or resides 
with a perpetrator of child abuse; 
(3) the child lacks “necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, 
or other required care”; 
(4) the child lacks “special care made necessary by a physical, 
mental, or emotional condition”; 
(5) the child is medically neglected; 
(6) the child’s “parent, guardian, or other custodian for good 
cause desires to be relieved of the child’s care and custody”; 
(7) the child was placed for adoption or care in violation of law; 
(8) the child lacks proper parental care; 
 
 58.  Id. §§ 260C.001, subdiv. 2, 260C.201, subdiv. 1, 6. 
 59.  See id. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6 (Supp. 2013); see also Act of May 23, 2013, 
ch. 108, art. 3, § 39, 2013 Minn. Laws 765, 765–66 (codified as amended at MINN. 
STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6) (amending certain definitions). 
 60.  MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6.  
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(9) the child’s “behavior, condition, or environment is such as to 
be injurious or dangerous to the child or others”; 
(10) the child is “experiencing growth delays, which may be 
referred to as failure to thrive, that have been diagnosed by a 
physician and are due to parental neglect”; 
(11) the child is exploited sexually; 
(12) the child “has committed a delinquent act or a juvenile petty 
offense before becoming ten years old”; 
(13) the child is a runaway; 
(14) the child is a habitual truant; 
(15) the child “has been found incompetent to proceed or has 
been found not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental 
deficiency in connection with a delinquency proceeding”; or 
(16) the child “has a parent whose parental rights to one or more 
other children were involuntarily terminated or whose 
custodial rights to another child have been involuntarily 
transferred to a relative and . . . the responsible social services 
agency document[ed] a compelling reason why filing the 
termination of parental rights petition . . . is not in the best 
interests of the child.”61 
Once a child and a family have been determined to fit within 
one of these broad categories, two things of significance happen. 
First, the court considers what disposition or treatment plan should 
be ordered and imposed upon the family and the child.62 Second, 
despite the definition and direction to work toward reunification of 
the child with the parents, the statutory criteria require immediate 
commencement of work to find a permanent placement for the 
child in a place other than his original home.63 
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.001 provides dispositions 
available to the court and social services.64 These possible 
alternatives run the gamut from providing in-home services to the 
family by the responsible social services agency to removal of the 
child and the transfer of legal custody to the responsible social 
services agency.65 When an out-of-home placement is required, the 
responsible social services agency is required to prepare an out-of-
 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2(b)(7) (2012).  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. § 260C.001.  
 65.  Id. § 260C.212.  
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home placement plan within thirty days.66 The plan is supposed to 
be prepared jointly with a parent or guardian in consultation with 
the child’s guardian ad litem, foster parent, or representative foster 
parent where appropriate.67 The plan is intended to provide a 
mechanism for return and reunification of the child with his 
parents upon completion of the plan.68 This plan is required to 
provide specific reasons for the placement of the child and a 
description of the problems or conditions in the home of the 
parent or parents that necessitate a removal of the child from the 
home in the first place.69 It also must specify the changes a parent 
or parents must make in order for the child to safely return home.70 
The responsible social services agency is then required to make 
“reasonable efforts” to assist the family in accomplishing the goals 
set for them in the case plan that resulted from the original need to 
have the child removed.71 
However, as a limitation to the “reasonable efforts” 
requirement, the statutes also support concurrent planning. For 
every child in foster care, the court must commence proceedings to 
determine permanent status of the child by holding an admit/deny 
hearing on a permanency petition, usually a TPR petition, no later 
than twelve months after the child is placed in foster care or in the 
care of noncustodial or nonresident parents.72 
Thus, the statutes insist on “concurrent planning” where the 
responsible social services agency is both theoretically providing a 
case plan for reunification and making reasonable efforts to reunify 
the family while at the same time planning exactly the opposite by 
looking at TPR or other permanency petition within a maximum of 
a twelve-month period.73 
VIII.  CONCURRENT PLANNING AS THE MINNESOTA APPROACH 
As noted, the essence of concurrent planning evolved 
historically from the actions taken on the national level as well as 
the state level. Problems in looking at long-term foster care 
 
 66.  Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1. 
 67.  Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(b). 
 68.  See id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c). 
 69.  Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c)(2). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c)(3)(ii). 
 72.  Id. § 260C.503, subdiv. 1. 
 73.  See id.  
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placements, jumping of foster homes, and little work by the county 
to actually try to reunify families have prompted a commitment 
across the country for fairly swift movement from reunification 
planning to permanency planning. Such movement is based on the 
assumption that a permanent placement of the child away from his 
or her parents is in fact in the child’s best interests in all 
circumstances if that child cannot return home. 
More specifically, Minnesota has codified the issues of 
concurrent permanency planning at Minnesota Statutes section 
260C.223. Within that statute, it is indicated that 
concurrent permanency planning involves a planning 
process for children who are placed out of the home of 
their parents pursuant to court order, or were voluntarily 
placed out of the home for 60 days or more who are 
developmentally disabled or emotionally disabled . . . . 
The responsible social services agency shall develop an 
alternate permanency plan while making reasonable 
efforts for reunification of the child with family if required 
by section 260.012.74 
In what almost seems to be contradictory on its face, the 
statute goes on to say that: 
[T]he goals of concurrent planning are to: 
(1) achieve early permanency for children; 
(2) decrease children’s length of stay in foster care 
and reduce the number of children experiencing foster 
care; and 
(3) develop a group of families who will work toward 
reunification and also serve as permanent families for 
children.75 
The thought is that social services workers, many of whom are 
often working on both sides of the concurrent planning at the 
same time, can be neutral and objective in providing all of the 
reasonable services, particularly when they may not be trained in 
the actual treatment as is necessary to accomplish development of a 
healthy family. 
Subdivision 5 only requires the development of guidelines and 
protocols if there is available funding,76 something that in recent 
times has not been as forthcoming as necessary. 
 
 74.  Id. § 260C.223, subdiv. 1 (citations omitted). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. § 260C.223, subdiv. 5.  
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IX. PERMANENCY CONSIDERATION AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS: A BLOCKADE TO EFFECTIVE TREATMENT OUTCOMES 
At this point in the system, we have a child who is out of the 
home. A treatment plan has been developed, supposedly dealing 
with the individualized needs of each child and family. As a more 
practical reality, however, case plans and treatment plans become a 
litany of checklists applicable in most cases to all families. They 
virtually always include a complete psychological evaluation, 
complete chemical dependency evaluation, complete parenting 
evaluation, and in every case a requirement that whatever is found 
in those evaluations, and whatever recommendations are made, be 
communicated to the parents or the child. This is often true 
regardless of whether or not any of these issues were the primary 
reason for the child being removed from the home. 
Treatment plans also disregard whether or not it is logical to 
believe that someone with a character disorder, schizophrenia, or 
other behavioral mental illness can be successfully “cured” in the 
time limits required by statute. That consideration, however, is not 
part of the statutory scheme. Rather, as noted, the statutory scheme 
focuses on how much time has run since the removal of the child 
rather than the steps taken toward reunification.77 At the outset, 
some permanency petition, usually the TPR petition, must be 
heard in court at an admit/deny hearing within twelve months of 
the date of the removal of the child.78 Once the concurrent 
planning track dealing with permanency has taken control, the 
effectiveness of any ongoing attempts at reunification is virtually 
eliminated.79 We now move into categories for proving that an 
involuntary TPR is appropriate. 
It is at that point we also then turn to Minnesota Statutes 
section 260C.301, which gives us a list of the categories of children 
and situations where TPR is allowed.80 Once again, there is a broad, 
sweeping scope of those children where TPR is going to be 
granted. More specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, 
subdivision 1 states as follows: 
 
 77.  Id. § 260C.204. 
 78.  Id. § 260C.503, subdiv. 1.  
 79.  See id. § 260C.212, subdiv. 1–2. 
 80.  Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b).  
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Subdivision 1. Voluntary and involuntary. The juvenile 
court may upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent 
to a child: 
(a) with the written consent of a parent who for good 
cause desires to terminate parental rights; or 
(b) if it finds that one or more of the following 
conditions exist: 
(1) that the parent has abandoned the child; 
(2) that the parent has substantially, continuously, 
or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the 
duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and 
child relationship; 
(3) that a parent has [failed to pay child 
support] . . . . ; 
(4) that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to 
the parent and child relationship . . . . ; 
(5) that following the child’s placement out of the 
home, reasonable efforts . . . have failed to correct the 
conditions leading to the child’s placement. It is 
presumed that reasonable efforts . . . have failed upon 
a showing that: 
(i) a child has resided out of the parental 
home under court order for a cumulative period 
of 12 months within the preceding 22 months. In 
the case of a child under age eight . . . , the 
presumption arises when the child has resided out 
of the parental home . . . for six months unless the 
parent has maintained regular contact with the 
child and the parent is complying with the out-of-
home placement plan; 
(ii) the court has approved the out-of-home 
placement plan . . . and filed with the court under 
section 260C.178; 
(iii) conditions leading to the out-of-home 
placement have not been corrected. . . . ; and 
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the 
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent 
and reunite the family. 
This clause does not prohibit the termination of 
parental rights prior to one year, or in the case of a 
child under age eight, prior to six months after a child 
has been placed out of the home. 
19
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It is also presumed that reasonable efforts have 
failed under this clause upon a showing that: 
(A) the parent has been diagnosed as 
chemically dependent . . . ; 
(B) the parent has been required by a case 
plan to participate in a chemical dependency 
treatment program; 
(C) the treatment programs offered to the 
parent were culturally, linguistically, and clinically 
appropriate; 
(D) the parent has either failed two or more 
times to successfully complete a treatment 
program or has refused at two or more separate 
meetings with a caseworker to participate in a 
treatment program; and 
(E) the parent continues to abuse chemicals. 
(6) that a child has experienced egregious harm 
in the parent’s care . . . ; 
(7) that in the case of a child born to a mother 
who was not married to the child’s father when the 
child was conceived nor when the child was born the 
person is not entitled to notice of an adoption 
hearing . . . and the person has not registered with the 
fathers’ adoption registry . . . ; 
(8) that the child is neglected and in foster care; 
or 
(9) that the parent has been convicted of a crime 
listed in section 260.012, paragraph (g), clauses (1) 
to (5).81 
Critically, section 260C.301, subdivision 1, paragraph b, 
clause 5 states that parental rights may be terminated if, after the 
child is placed out of the home, reasonable efforts have failed to 
correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.82 There are 
then specific circumstances under which reasonable efforts are 
presumed, but the reality is that the burden appears to shift to the 
parent to show that reasonable efforts have not existed or been 
offered by the responsible social services agency.83 
 
 81.  Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1. 
 82.  Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(5). 
 83.  See id.  
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X. CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY AND MENTAL HEALTH— 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
As described in previous sections of this article, there is a 
continuing disconnect between the worlds of law and mental 
health. We see this in child protection cases, specifically confronted 
when the timeline for a permanency petition runs into the ongoing 
treatment of a mental health or chemical dependency issue for the 
parent or child. Therapies, diagnostics and approaches to 
treatment must be considered in determining how the disconnect 
between the law and mental health arose and why it continues 
today. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) is a series of manuals designed to categorize and organize 
mental disorders.84 The American Psychiatric Association published 
the fifth edition in 2013. The DSM-5 “is a classification of mental 
disorders with associated criteria designed to facilitate more 
reliable diagnoses of these disorders.”85 Historically, “it has become 
a standard reference for clinical practice in the mental health 
field.”86 This manual is technically designed for clinical practice. 
However, it has been increasingly used in other fields.87 As 
specifically stated in the DSM-5, the information is useful and may 
be valuable to “all professionals associated with various aspects of 
mental health care, including psychiatrists, other physicians, 
psychologists, social workers, nurses, counselors, forensic and legal 
specialists, occupational and rehabilitation therapists, and other 
health professionals.”88 From this definitional information we see 
the very players we also see in the child protection system: social 
workers and legal specialists (lawyers). It is essential that social 
workers and lawyers have an understanding of what tools are being 
used by the diagnosticians. 
Often a child protection social worker has a background in 
social science, social work, or psychology. More often though, 
judges, lawyers, and legislators, who assist in drafting and passing 
 
 84. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (Susan K. Schultz & Emily A. Kuhl eds., 5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
DSM-5].  
 85.  Id. at xli.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
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and applying these laws, do not. This becomes problematic when 
the basic tenets and tools for success in the arena of mental health 
concerns do not work with permanency timelines and what we, as 
society and legal specialists, have deemed best for children. 
As would be expected, there is a significant amount of 
expertise that goes into developing and constructing the DSM-5. It 
“is intended to serve as a practical, functional, and flexible guide 
for organizing information that can aid in the accurate diagnosis 
and treatment of mental disorders.”89 The DSM-5 is broken down 
into a variety of categories, and working groups of psychologists, 
PhDs, MDs, and consultants worked in conjunction on each group 
for over twelve years.90 The major classifications are as follows: 
(1) Neurodevelopmental Disorders; 
(2) Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders; 
(3) Bipolar and Related Disorders; 
(4) Depressive Disorders; 
(5) Anxiety Disorders; 
(6) Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders; 
(7) Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders; 
(8) Dissociative Disorders; 
(9) Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders; 
(10) Feeding and Eating Disorders; 
(11) Elimination Disorders; 
(12) Sleep-Wake Disorders; 
(13) Sexual Dysfunctions; 
(14) Gender Dysphoria; 
(15) Disruptive, Impulse-Control, and Conduct Disorders; 
(16) Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders; 
(17) Neurocognitive Disorders; 
(18) Personality Disorders; 
(19) Paraphilic Disorders; 
(20) Other Mental Disorders; 
(21) Medication-Induced Movement Disorders and Other Adverse 
Effects of Medication; and 
(22) Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention.91 
 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at xliii, 5.  
 91.  Id. at 27.  
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In the CHIPS and TPR legal systems, many classifications do 
not often arise, or at least are not commonly diagnosed in a way 
that is seen by the legal practitioners who practice in juvenile court. 
It certainly does not mean that they cannot arise; they are just not 
as commonly seen or diagnosed. Also, it is difficult to miss, in 
looking at this list, the practical ramification of this list itself. 
Perhaps it is longer than one might anticipate; it is certainly clear 
that it involves a spectrum of disorders and diagnoses that many 
people, including lawyers and legislators, have never heard of. “As a 
result, it is important to note that the definition of mental disorder 
included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, 
public health professionals, and research investigators rather than 
all of the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”92 
However, to appropriately function in the legal aspects of child 
protection, a practitioner must have at least a basic understanding 
and education of the metal health issues that are often an 
underlying component of the parents’ or child’s functioning. 
It is also essential to remember that mental illness alone and 
the possibility of chemical dependency issues do not result in 
children automatically being removed from a parent.93 Ultimately, 
in many situations there is an underlying mental health or 
chemical dependency issue for the parents of children who may 
end up in the child protection system.94 Oftentimes this is seen as 
alcohol abuse, a variety of drug use, or mental health disorders that 
result in a parent being unable to care for a child due to that 
disorder.95 Again, many parents with underlying mental health 
issues do not find their way into the child protection system.96 But 
oftentimes the ones who are in the child protection system are 
there due to a mental health or chemical dependency issue that 
 
 92.  Id. at 25. 
 93.  Interview with Monica Seidel, Psychotherapist, Univ. of Minn. Cmty. 
Univ. Health Care Ctr. (CUHCC), in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 7, 2013). Prior to 
the last three years at CUHCC, Ms. Seidel worked for the Wilder Foundation for 
ten years, serving as both a school social worker and then a residential therapist in 
Wilder’s inpatient residential treatment program. Her areas of expertise include 
children’s mental health, childhood trauma, PTSD, integrative therapists, family 
systems, and attachment disorders. She received her Master of Social Work from 
the University of Minnesota and her Bachelor of Arts from the University of Notre 
Dame.  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
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has resulted in their lack of ability to parent.97 Mental illness alone 
is not a barrier to parenting. 
XI. HOW DO MENTAL HEALTH AND CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY ISSUES 
INTERSECT WITH CHILD PROTECTION AND WHAT IS THE RESULT 
As previously discussed, at the beginning of a CHIPS action 
and once a child protection social worker gets involved, the parent 
is almost routinely sent to a therapist for diagnostic testing or 
assessment and often receives a chemical dependency evaluation.98 
This is done to determine what issues, concerns, or struggles the 
parent may have that is leading to or resulting in parenting issues.99 
Ultimately, if one cannot care for his or her child, that child will be 
removed prior to any diagnosis because in this system the child’s 
needs are considered the primary needs to be met.100 However, this 
removal of a child from his or her home in and of itself commences 
a mindset for most parents—that is, “What do I have to do to get 
my child back?” Even at the beginning, it is about the end goal of 
regaining that child, not about the possibly much-needed therapy 
plan for the parent. 
Often one issue pervasively leads to another. This becomes 
very relevant in case planning and indicates there should not be a 
one-size-fits-all mentality for children or parents when it comes to 
mental illness therapies and chemical dependency treatments. For 
instance, sometimes the root cause of the functioning issues for the 
parent can be addiction to cocaine, methamphetamines, or other 
drugs; sometimes the parent suffers from alcohol addiction and 
related issues; sometimes the parent is, in fact, dealing with 
chemical dependency issues only secondarily to significant mental 
health issues such as bipolar disorder or another significant 
personality or mood disorder. It is routine for a parent who has 
entered the system to suffer from these illnesses and, as a case plan 
is being developed, for a child protection social worker to look into 
whether a chemical dependency or mental health evaluation and 
therapy are necessary. This is where the variety of diagnostic tools 
as outlined in the DSM-5 and treatment options come into play. 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 7 (2012) (“[T]he best interests 
of the child must be the paramount consideration. . . .”). 
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Once a referral has been made by a social worker as part of a case 
plan to a diagnostician and/or therapist, a parent is required to 
work with these professionals as outlined in the case plan. However, 
the treatment is outlined and driven by what is required by the law 
in the child protection system. It is not governed as much by the 
mental health or chemical dependency professionals, which would 
be best for the ultimate treatment goals of the parent. But, as 
mentioned, parents are often willing to do whatever they can to get 
their children returned to their home because they only have a 
certain amount of time to “get better” as designed by law. 
XII.  REALITIES OF TREATMENT AND THERAPIES 
Once a parent receives the case plan, one typical requirement 
of the plan is to receive individual therapy services, many times 
regardless of a diagnoses or what a therapist may recommend.101 A 
parent establishes services, and typically on his or her own begins 
therapy and receives a diagnostic assessment as outlined in the 
criteria in the DSM-5.102 At that point, a therapy treatment plan is 
put into play that governs how the individual therapy sessions will 
work.103 When a child protection worker learns that a parent has 
established a therapist as directed, the worker asks a parent to sign 
a release of information so there is communication between the 
worker and therapist. This is to ensure that the parent is complying 
with therapy attendance and to seek recommendations from the 
therapist on future service needs. This is one area where the goals 
of therapy and goals of child protection simply do not match up. 
Ultimately the parent’s goal with child protection is to be as 
compliant and upstanding as possible in an effort to reunify with 
his or her child. 
Yet, the goal of the parent-client in therapy, from a therapist’s 
perspective, is to establish a trusting relationship in order to expose 
mental health symptoms and behavioral concerns that are festering 
and in need of resolution.104 As stated above, there is a specific 
timeline as designed by child protection services and the statutes of 
the State of Minnesota for completion of a successful child 
 
 101.  See Interview with Monica Seidel, supra note 93.  
 102.  See DSM-5, supra note 84, at sec. II.  
 103.  Id. at 19–21. 
 104.  See id. 
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protection plan.105 The therapy and the child protection plan are 
often not in sync. For instance, some therapy issues are long-term 
issues that simply cannot be resolved in a six-month window and 
require ongoing therapy even if the parent was to be successful in 
the completion of the child protection plan. A client who is 
participating in therapy pursuant to the direction of child 
protection, if answering and working truthfully with the therapist, 
can use the therapy as intended but often does not look “better,” as 
is needed for a successful child protection case plan.106 Often there 
is reluctance for parents ordered through child protection into 
therapy to make good use of the therapeutic relationship—hence a 
cycle of a family being in and out of child protection over time may 
be set in motion.107 But, in the end, if serious mental health and 
chemical dependency issues are not truly dealt with as designed by 
mental health professionals, the parent is likely to fail in continued 
and future case plans. Therefore, concurrent planning is made that 
much more necessary. 
XIII.  CONCLUSION—WHAT NOW?108 
The history of the development of the timelines for moving 
toward “permanency” in a child’s life after removal from the 
parents’ home and the development of “concurrent planning” 
both in fact have some basis in rational and sociological thought. 
The fact that children are often moved from foster home to foster 
home, not having an opportunity to attach or have stability and 
security within someone’s home, and the realization that in most 
cases, placement of a child on a permanent basis with a relative was 
in the child’s best interests, have led to a reexamination of the 
manner in which children are removed from the home and under 
 
 105.  See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.  
 106.  See Interview with Monica Seidel, supra note 93.  
 107.  See id. 
 108.  The comments and opinions expressed in the “Conclusion” section of 
this article are those of the authors based on their years of experience and 
observations of the interaction between the often conflicting goals of reunification 
and permanency. This is particularly true as noted in the other parts of the article 
in the overlay of attempts at reunification within the context of actually providing 
substantial and effective mental health and chemical dependency services. Thus, 
the expressed opinions are based upon the information provided in the early part 
of the article, the authors’ experience, and the conflicts reflected in the main body 
of the article. 
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what circumstances and under what timelines they are returned 
home or placed permanently somewhere else. 
The problem is that the legal requirements often do not have 
any relationship to the likelihood of success in dealing with the 
underlying causes of family trauma or family issues. While the 
courts look to the social workers and the psychologists for 
recommendations regarding treatment, they rarely are allowed to 
give the parents sufficient time in that therapy or in the chemical 
dependency program to fully deal with the issues underlying the 
initial removal. 
The courts are forced to move toward permanency on a fast 
track, where the items they look at in concluding that permanency 
is necessary rarely refer directly to the success of treatment or other 
therapy and programs. Rather, they look to the “success” of the 
therapy in the short time allowed by the timeline requirement, as 
presented by the social workers and the counties. They look to how 
long the child has been out of the home, what the parent has done, 
and whether the parent has been “compliant” with the 
requirements of the “case plan.” 
Since the case plans rarely deal initially with the actual issues, 
but rather are a sweeping generalization of significant testing and 
obligations through various programs as applied to all cases, the 
courts rarely have significant information to avoid the strict 
requirements of the statutory movement toward permanency. 
Additionally, since the “concurrent planners” have, through-
out the course of the case, assumed and planned for the failure of 
the parents to meet the “case plan goals,” there is the constant 
pressure to move toward permanency and to get the case closed 
and done. The situation where a parent has been compliant and 
has worked hard in therapy, but is not ready to have the child 
returned, poses a dilemma for the courts and the counties that the 
law does not allow them to contemplate. Rather, the courts are 
pushed against the wall to make permanency decisions along with 
strict timelines, sometimes regardless of the recommendations of 
the treating psychologist. 
How courts deal with mental health issues in the juvenile 
protection system remains a problem. Even when they rely upon an 
initial evaluation, courts are often unable to rely on the ongoing 
recommendations of the psychologists. Additionally, parents are 
often unable to create a significant trust relationship with treating 
psychologists or social workers as a result of knowing that anything 
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they say can and will be used in order to prevent their children 
from returning home, which causes deep divisions in a system 
designed to help children and at least theoretically return them to 
the parents. 
Since the courts are hamstrung in many cases in their effort to 
assist children and families based on the recommendations of the 
therapists and the mental health professionals, and since all 
assistance, therapy, and program resolutions are an open book not 
only to the county workers but the court, and in most cases, the 
general public, the flexibility of the court system is severely 
hampered. 
What is necessary is that the laws be amended in order to give 
the courts and the professionals the flexibility to deal with the 
treatment issues beyond the scope of the requirements of moving 
to a permanency decision and the undermining of treatment 
systems by concurrent planning. The failure to integrate mental 
health flexibility into the rigidity of the statutory scheme, as we 
have seen, rarely meets the “individualized needs” of children, thus 
thwarting the original goals of the system to protect children and 
families. 
The concern about children moving in foster care and not 
having permanency has resulted in an unbending system which 
often is not able to do what is, in fact, in a child’s best interests and 
what will, in fact, reunite the family unit. 
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